partner's act "binds the partnership ...." However, section 9 also recognizes that a partner may, as to any particular act, lack "authority" conferred by fellow partners (just as any agent may lack actual authority conferred by the principal), for example as a consequence of a restriction or limit imposed by the partnership agreement. Section 9 reconciles the possibility that a partner may deal with a third party by acting without actual authority but by also "apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership" by looking to the state of knowledge of the party with whom the partner dealt: the partnership is bound unless the third party "has knowledge of the fact that" the partner lacks authority. Thus, as to third parties who lack such knowledge, a partner's unauthorized act binds the partnership when the act and the partner's manner of acting satisfy the criteria prescribed in section 9. By acting without authority the partner acted wrongfully toward the partnership and, like any agent whose unauthorized conduct binds the like the common law, recognize that actual authority (and ratification, which creates actual authority after the fact) is not the sole basis for attributing the legal consequences of an agent's act to the principal. 10 When a partner acts without actual authority, by statute a third party may bind the partnership when the partner appeared to act in the ordinary course of partnership business and the third party did not know and had not received a notification that the partner lacked authority. The basis for binding the partnership, in other words, derives from the partner's status or position as a partner, subject to stated limits, including the third party's knowledge, and not from communications or other manifestations about authority made by the partnership, whether to the partner, a particular third party, or a broader audience, including manifestations made through a title assigned to the partner that is generally understood to encompass authority of a particular type and scope.
The analysis is not the same within common-law agency. Unless the principal has ratified 9 Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 7.05 [1] at 7-41.
10
Formally defined, "[a]n agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act." Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01. an agent's unauthorized act, a third party seeking to hold the principal to the act's legal consequences would turn to the doctrine of apparent authority. An agent's apparent authority stems from a manifestation made by the principal; the principal is bound when the third party reasonably believes the agent (or other actor) has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to a manifestation of the principal.
11 Apparent authority looks outward, to the principal's manifestations, their connection to the third party, and the reasonableness (or not)
of the third party's belief. Apparent authority is not an inward-focused doctrine grounded in the principal's relationship to the agent, as is a partner's statutory power to bind the partnership.
To be sure, it's understandable that a partner's statutory power to bind might be characterized as an instance of "apparent authority" 12 when it diverges from actual authority. The statutory language itself refers to "apparently" carrying on partnership business in the usual way, and a third party with knowledge or on notice that a partner lacks authority may not bind the partnership (unless it ratifies the partner's act), just as a third party on notice that an agent lacks authority may not rely on apparent authority to bind the principal. But a third party seeking to hold a partnership need show no manifestation made by the partnership that underpinned the third party's belief that the partner had authority. More narrowly (and more theoretically), a partner may have actual authority on the basis of the partner's status as a partner plus the absence 11
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 ("[a]pparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations.").
12
For this usage, see Ribstein et al. at 127 (referring to "the scope of the partners' apparent authority, at least to the extent that third parties are not notified of any limitation on the partners' power"). More guardedly, RULLCA's drafters state that UPA (1914) "codified a particular form of apparent authority by position ...." RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 3 & § 301, cmt. a (UPA "codifies the common law notion of apparent authority by position ...."). of any relevant restriction or limitation in the partnership agreement, but with no separate or discrete manifestation conferring authority from the partnership to that partner.
Of course, a partnership may act through agents who are not its partners. Non-partner agents may be situated internally as firm employees, such as a business manager or an associate lawyer in a law firm that is organized as a partnership, or externally, such as an external investment manager or broker. Whether the acts of a non-partner agent bind the partnership is not resolved by partnership law, but by general common-law agency. However, partnership law itself, and the partnership agreement, determine whether a partner binds the partnership by engaging a particular actor as an agent. For example, if an individual partner, acting contrary to the partnership agreement, engaged the "agent," UPA section 9 and RUPA section 301 require inquiry into whether the partner's action constituted "apparently carrying on in the usual way" (or the ordinary course) the partnership's business, and whether the "agent" knew or had received a notification that the partner lacked authority to engage her on behalf of the partnership.
13

Inherent agency power
For these reasons, the terminology of "positional power" more cleanly specifies partners' position as agents and differentiates them from common-law agency.
14 For some scholars, the closest point of comparison within general agency law is likely be the doctrine of inherent
13
Agency law is also relevant to defining supervisory authority over an entity's employees. See RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 4. 14 Referring to the power as "positional" is clearer than "partnership power;" an agent who acts with apparent authority but not actual authority exercises a power but one stemming from manifestations made by the principal, not the agent's status or relationship to the principal. Id. § 8A ("the power of an agent which is derived not from authority, actual authority or estoppel, but solely for the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent").
18
When a principal is undisclosed, a third party has no notice that the agent is acting for a principal. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04 (2)(b). A principal is "unidentified" when the third party has notice that the agent acts for a principal but does not have notice of the principal's identity. Id. § 1.04(2)(c). In earlier terminology, an unidentified principal was a "partially disclosed" principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4(2) (criticizing term as less accurate than "unidentified principal.").
19
For this critique, see McMeel. agency power may have represented an interim response to early challenges to the intellectual merit of agency as a "'proper title in the law.'" 20 As a free-standing doctrine, inherent agency power risked outcomes in transactional contexts in which a third party on notice of limits on an agent's authority would nevertheless be able to bind a disclosed principal. 21 In any event, as a doctrinal formulation, inherent agency power operated only one-way, that is, to bind the principal at the behest of a third party. A partner's statutory or positional power, in contrast, operates bilaterally, to bind both the partnership and the third party with whom the partner dealt.
And neither the text of Restatement (Second), nor the available history, relies on partnership law for an instance of inherent agency power. DeMott at __(quoting doubts of Oliver Wendell Holmes).
21
The theoretical possibility was realized in Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206 , 1208 (Ind. 2000 .
22
For an account of that history, see DeMott. The drafter of the original Uniform Partnership Act, exploring its history, did not examine specifics of the fit between partners' agency powers and common-law agency but did discuss the impact of a partner's death on the agency capacity of the surviving partners plus whether partners were to be viewed as agents of a legal entity or as co-principals (and agents) on an aggregate account of partnership. Lewis at 638, 639. Partnership makes a brief appearance in Restatement (Second) of Agency, in which § 8A repeats the definition in UPA § 6 ("an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit"). 23 Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 1.01[1] at 1-7 (footnotes omitted). state law; unlike general partnership law, LLC law is far from uniform.
24 LLC statutes vary in many ways, including the circumstances under which the LLC is bound by the unauthorized act of a member or manager of the LLC. LLC statutes also vary in the clarity with which they address agency-related issues, including the statute's relationship to the common law; at times some statutes have been explicitly disconnected from the common law in basic respects, while some statutory formulations are confused.
The confusion may stem from the history of LLC legislation and from drafters' reliance on partnership statutes. From early days, LLCs could elect to be managed by their members (resembling in this respect a general partnership) or centrally by managers. LLCs from early days also contemplated the execution of two documents: (1) an organizational form to be submitted for filing with the secretary of state or another official designated by the state, like the document and filing requisite for a corporation or a limited partnership; and (2) an internal agreement, not filed with the state, often termed an operating agreement or limited liability company agreement (which many statutes do not require to be reduced to writing) and which resembles a partnership agreement. 25 Early concerns centered on achieving tax classification for LLCs as partnerships, likely prompting some of the agency-related provisions in LLC statutes.
The tax concerns were obviated in 1997 by a "check-the-box" regime for unincorporated domestic entities that do not issue publicly-traded interests, which enables each entity to choose its own tax treatment. Regardless, and returning to the metaphor of the menagerie of business 24 As of late summer 2014, seven states plus the Virgin Islands had adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) . Seven states plus the District of Columbia had adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006) . 25 And the Delaware statute now excludes the applicability of the state's general statute of frauds. See Del. Code Ann., tit. 18-101(7). forms, viewed from the perspective of agency-related characteristics, many LLC statutes house the new entity either in close proximity to partnerships, not incorporated entities, or in a distant enclosure away from the menagerie's other inhabitants.
Positional powers under LLC statutes
In some LLC statutes, provisions comparable to the language in partnership statutes specify the position of members and managers as agents. For example, under section 301 of the Uniform LLC Act (ULLCA) (1996) , "each member is an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business" and the member's act "for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the company's business" binds the LLC, unless the member lacked authority so to act for the LLC and the third party "knew or had notice" that the member lacked authority. But-and in contrast to a default-rule general partnership-centralized management is an express and formal statutory option for LLC structures. Under ULLCA, when an LLC is manager-managed, "a member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its business solely by reason of being a member."
26 Each manager is an agent for the purpose of the LLC's business, subject to the same limitations applicable to a member's agency power in a member-managed LLC. 27 ULLCA requires that the articles for an LLC specify whether it is to be manager-managed, 28 which could enable third parties to make this basic determination about any LLC with which they may deal. As does N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57D-2-30(e), discussed infra. 44 Frost at 47. 45 Ribstein et al. at 161 (statute "arguably makes the operating agreement control both actual and apparent authority of members and managers, but it could also be argued that the default rule conferring on each member and manager authority to bind the LLC confers apparent authority on one who does not know of a contrary provision in the operating agreement"); Bishop & Kleinberger ¶ 14.04[3] [a] at 14-115 (characterizing "authority" as ambiguous).
46
Del. Code Ann., tit. 6, §18-1101(b). parties to the contract and to a limited cast of further characters, in particular third parties who have enforceable rights to benefit from performance of the contract. A commitment to "the principle of freedom of contract" implicitly demarcates parties to a contract from non-parties; the principle is not equivalent to deeming the world at large to know the contract's terms. 47 Even more startling than the confused state of Delaware LLC law, in some states statutes explicitly provided that an LLC is not bound by the act of a member or manager that contravenes the operating agreement although the third party is unaware of the restriction and acts reasonably. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1317(B). See also former Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, § 2019C, which provided that "[p]ersons dealing with members or managers of the limited liability company shall be deemed to have knowledge of the restrictions on the authority of members or managers contained in a written operating agreement if the articles of organization of the limited liability company contain a statement that such restrictions exist." 50 "the operating agreement governs authority, period" 51 whether or not a third party has notice of its terms appears only to arm transactional parties that happen to be LLCs with an extracontractual option to repudiate commitments made by their representatives that is unavailable to businesses otherwise organized, which is likely to surprise reasonable third parties when the LLC deploys the option at a later time to avoid the legal consequences of its representative's actions.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Formal statutory reforms
Statutory parties who deal with the LLC, in particular third parties who lack notice of the restriction.
Under RULLCA, as for incorporated business entities, much work is assigned to the doctrine of apparent authority. For example, designating someone as a "manager" likely implicates the power to bind the LLC as to matters within the ordinary course of business.
54
The language might helpfully have acknowledged that an agent's conduct may also lead to legally-enforceable rights that the principal may wish to exercise as against third parties with whom the agent dealt. Frost at 47. RULLCA itself provides in § 407(c)(3) that in a manager-managed LLC, "a difference arising among managers as to a matter in the ordinary course of the activities of the company may be decided by a majority of the managers." This language contemplates that a less than all members as managers or designating non-members as the LLC's sole managers.
Thus, member-management is the default option but the operating agreement may specify otherwise. Under section 3-20 (c) "each manager may act on behalf of the LLC in the ordinary course of its business" subject to direction and control of a majority of managers. As with the 62 Rutledge & Frost at 52. The resolution for the new-LLC hypothetical, introduced in this article, proposes a slight variant, which is that the member in question "has actual authority to take actions the member reasonably believes are necessary or incidental to achieving the objectives of the LLC so long as the member is not aware of any differing belief among the members and the act is within the ordinary course of the activities of the LLC." Id. My proposed analysis is narrower by a smidgen: a member who anticipates that fellow members may well object would have an incentive to act before fellow members are clued in to the action the member plans to take. Perhaps the member harboring such a suspicion would not also "reasonably believe" that what the member does is necessary or incidental to the LLC's objectives, but the analytic focus within agency law in determining whether an agent acted with actual authority is consistency with the principal's known manifestations, which include "circumstances of which the agent has notice and the agent's fiduciary duty to the principal." Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02(2). A reasonable person in the agent's situation, with the new LLC as a principal, might be on notice of the "circumstance" of the agent's own suspicions about the principal, that is, the likely objection by fellow LLC members.
63
For an overview of the statute from the chair of the bar committee that drafted the act, see Keen. Delaware LLC statute, the first question posed by these provisions is whether a member/manager's status-derived power to "act on behalf of the LLC in the ordinary course of its business" is subject to any further constraints, if the act is in the "ordinary course" of the LLC's business. Would the member/manager's power to bind encompass acts known to the third party to represent self-dealing transactions or acts effected through atypical means? Section 2-30(e) makes applicable "the laws of agency and contract" unless provided otherwise in the statute, but this section explicitly addresses only the "administration and enforcement of operating agreements."
66 If the third party has notice of terms in the operating agreement that restrict a manager's authority (including the authority of a member/manager), neither actual nor apparent authority would enable the third party to hold the LLC to the legal consequences of the manager's unauthorized act. But one wonders whether apparent-authority principles limit the status-derived power of a member to bind an LLC to a transaction that would reasonably appear to a third party not to be authorized based on the nature of the transaction or the means through which the member effects it, when the third party has no notice of any limitations imposed by the operating agreement. Perhaps such a transaction is assumed not to be in "the ordinary course" of the LLC's business, but this may require heavy lifting by "ordinary course."
In contrast with the Delaware statute, the North Carolina statute is clear about the impact of provisions in an operating agreement that restrict authority. Under section 2-30(b)(2), an operating agreement "does not apply" to persons "who are not parties or otherwise bound by the operating agreement." 67 A third party, neither a party to an operating agreement nor bound by it 66
Id. § 2-30(e).
67
Id. § 2-30(b)(2).
as the statute specifies, 68 would be a party to whom the operating agreement "does not apply ..."
Admittedly, stating that an operating agreement "does not apply" to a person is not precisely the same as stating that the person is not deemed to be on notice of its contents; but notably the North Carolina statute omits any language deeming all who may deal with or otherwise encounter an LLC to have knowledge of the terms of its operating agreement. And to preserve the potential of apparent authority as a limiting constraint on unauthorized actions, it's important that the statute does not state that non-parties are not "affected by" the agreement.
Non-statutory solutions
By this point in the Chapter, two facts may puzzle the reader. Separately, and requiring "factual evaluation," was whether the individual acted with apparent authority, an inquiry "which must consider whether Defendant made representations to Plaintiff indicating that [individual] was its agent, whether Plaintiff relied on them, and whether that reliance was reasonable." 72 Unremarkable as an articulation of agency doctrine, the court's opinion nonetheless is remarkable for the absence of any reference to the LLC statute. Perhaps provided" language would be helpful.
In the second case, the Court of Chancery likewise did not refer to the LLC statute in denying motions for summary judgment; the case stemmed from an employee's use of funds embezzled from his employer to buy property on behalf of an LLC in which he and another individual were members. In B.A.S.S. Group, LLC v. Coastal Supply Co. , once the embezzlement came to light, the now-former employee settled with his former employer on terms that required transfer to the former employer of property purchased for the LLC with the embezzled funds. 2009 WL 1743730 at *6. Not helping the plaintiff was the strength of the former employer's counterclaim for unjust enrichment. The court held that the LLC was not a bona fide purchaser for value of the embezzled funds and denied summary judgment on the counterclaim only because the parties did not address "who should capture the upside of the Property" if any value remained net of the embezzled funds plus interest. Id. at * 7. The same committee sponsored the meeting that generated multiple interpretations of Delaware 's statute in 2006. See Frost at 11. 76 Single-member LLCs "once suspect because novel ..., are now popular both for sole proprietorships and as corporate subsidiaries." RULLCA, Prefatory Note at 1.
77
Id. item 5.1 (iii).
78
Id. at 780 n. 15, citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03.
-26-basis on which an LLC may be bound by an unauthorized act may represent an informed professional consensus inclined to reject an interpretation of statutory language disconnected on this issue from the common law.
CONCLUSION
External agency is essential to the capacity of any business entity to engage in business dealings with other entities and with individuals. Perhaps the relatively settled nature of common-law agency makes it all the more surprising that the most basic agency question of all-the power to bind a firm-has been so muddled over the history of LLC statutes and is treated ambiguously in the Delaware LLC statute. This Chapter demonstrates that the muddle is avoidable. RULLCA achieves clarity by jettisoning the partnership-derived concept of positional powers and by affirmatively embracing the common law to resolve agency questions. Separately, a statute might retain powers of position for LLC members and managers but also specify-as do partnership statutes-the circumstances under which an unauthorized act would bind the LLC, while also specifying that restrictions on authority contained in operating agreements do not affect the legal position of a third party who lacks knowledge or notice of the restrictions.
